2nd January 2026 – 9th January 2026
LOCAL NEWS
1. Cyprus begins EU Council Presidency with Official Opening Ceremony
With the Republic of Cyprus having assumed the Presidency of the Council of the EU on 1 January 2026, on the 7th January 2026, the official opening ceremony of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) took place at the Cyprus Theatre Organisation’s (THOC) Main Stage in Nicosia, in the attendance of prominent figures from Cyprus and abroad, including foreign leaders, heads of European institutions, members of the European Parliament, senior government officials, as well as prominent personalities from the country's political, business and social life.
Among the distinguished guests, the President of the Cyprus Union of Shipowners, Mr. Polys V. Hajioannou, and the vice president Mr. Andreas Hadjiyiannis, represented both our Union and the Cyprus shipping industry in the landmark ceremony.
The opening ceremony featured an introduction by the Deputy Minister for European Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Ms Marilena Raouna, followed by addresses delivered by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, the President of the European Council, Mr António Luís Santos da Costa, the President of the European Commission, Ms Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of Ukraine, Mr Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
In his address, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Nikos Christodoulides, emphasised that the current geopolitical environment offers an opportunity for stronger, more secure, united and autonomous Europe. Cyprus, he added, due to its geostrategic location, will continue to serve as a reliable bridge for dialogue and cooperation in the wider region.
“This will also be the objective of our presidency: a EU that combines its strategic autonomy with its international openness. A Union that can defend its interests and its citizens while also acting as a force for peace, stability and growth. A Union that boldly supports multilateralism and the rule of international law.”
Related Articles:
Opening Ceremony of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2026 - Gov.cy
2. Cyprus Union of Shipowners Discuss Shipping Priorities with President Nikos Christodoulides Ahead of EU Council Presidency
On the 8th January 2026, President Nikos Christodoulides met at the Presidential Palace with the President and Vice President of our Union, Messrs Polys V. Hajioannou and Andreas Hadjiyiannis and the Shipping Deputy Minister Mrs. Marina Hadjimanoli, to discuss the shipping priorities of the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
The meeting provided an opportunity to exchange views on advancing Cypriot shipping interests at a time when the sector is increasingly recognised as vital to Europe’s economic stability. Discussions focused on the shipping-related objectives of the Cypriot Presidency, aimed at reinforcing the sector’s strategic role in strengthening supply chain resilience, supporting economic growth, and enhancing the EU’s overall competitiveness.
Decarbonisation of shipping was also addressed, with emphasis placed on the need for a realistic and technically viable approach pursued within the framework of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Participants underlined the importance of preserving the IMO’s international and technical mandate, while taking into account the positions of major maritime nations, including the United States and China, which have expressed concerns regarding regulatory models based solely on taxation.
Overall, the discussions highlighted the importance of strengthening the institutional and international standing of Cypriot shipping, while safeguarding the technical role of the IMO and avoiding its evolution into a mechanism for global fiscal redistribution.
Related Articles:
Cyprus Mail 9/1 - Cyprus sets out shipping priorities for EU Council Presidency
Attachment 1: ΚΥΠΕ 8.1.26 - Προτεραιότητες Κυπριακής Προεδρίας ΕΕ για ναυτιλία, στη συνάντηση πλοιοκτητών-ΠτΔ
StockWatch 8.1.26 - Προτεραιότητες Προεδρίας ΕΕ για ναυτιλία, στη συνάντηση πλοιοκτητών-ΠτΔ
Brief 8.1.26 - Προτεραιότητες Κυπριακής Προεδρίας ΕΕ για ναυτιλία, στη συνάντηση πλοιοκτητών-ΠτΔ
Πολίτης 9.1.26 - Οι προτεραιότητες Κυπριακής Προεδρίας ΕΕ για την ναυτιλία
3. Marina Hadjimanolis: Greece, Cyprus, Israel create a digital platform for marine pollution
The Cyprus Shipping Deputy Minister, Ms. Marina Hadjimanolis announced that the Council of Ministers of Cyprus has decided the establishment of the Pollution Response Oversight and Coordination Team (PROCT). The Team’s mandate includes proposing measures to enhance the implementation of relevant legislation, streamlining and simplifying existing procedures, leveraging technology for prevention, monitoring, and incident reporting, defining and tracking measurable performance indicators, and coordinating the various agencies involved in responding to marine pollution, which remains a persistent challenge for Cyprus and the broader Eastern Mediterranean region. Taking into account this issue and aiming to strengthen prevention and response mechanisms, the Deputy Ministry of Shipping submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers to establish an executive body responsible for managing this issue.
Ms. Hadjimanolis noted that the effectiveness of PROCT will be supported by a dedicated digital platform, which will be provided to the Committee for the Prevention and Response to Marine Pollution. Developed under the EMMERA project with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, the platform will enable the systematic collection, processing, and integration of data, substantially enhancing both the operational and strategic capabilities of the Committee.
Additionally, in collaboration with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), plans are underway to deploy drones for real-time monitoring and data collection. This will facilitate targeted interventions in the most critical maritime areas. Through these measures, Cyprus is not only modernizing its technological resources to protect the marine environment in the Eastern Mediterranean but is also strengthening its ability to prevent and respond effectively to incidents of marine pollution.
Related Article:
4. Cyprus shipping enters 2026 in stronger shape, says Shipping Deputy Minister
In an interview with Philenews on Monday, 4th January 2026, Shipping Deputy Minister, Ms. Marina Hadjimanolis, said that Shipping remains one of the strongest pillars of Cyprus's economy and international presence and expressed her determination to maintain and strengthen this role, emphasizing that Cyprus’ maritime sector enters 2026 in “stronger shape”, having overcome recent disruptions, and further bolstering its global standing.
Ms. Hadjimanolis said the Deputy Ministry of Shipping is implementing a targeted strategic plan focused on upgrading services and more systematically promoting the competitive advantages of the Cyprus ship registry and the wider maritime cluster.
“The results are impressive,” the Minister said. “The Cyprus ship registry has grown steadily over the last two years, recording a 21 per cent increase since September 2023.” “At the same time, the contribution of ship management to GDP now exceeds 5.5 per cent,” she added.
“Cyprus being the only EU country represented at the recent Conference in Jeddah shows the recognition and respect our country enjoys as a reliable maritime partner,” Ms. Hadjimanolis pointed out, describing her participation as the sole EU minister on a high-level ministerial panel as “a true honour but also a clear signal of Cyprus’ credibility and active presence in the wider Gulf region”.
She also emphasised Cyprus’ geographic role as a connector between regions. “As I underlined during my intervention, Cyprus lies at the northeast edge of Europe but is also very close to the Arab world, making Cyprus a natural bridge between the two regions,” Ms. Hadjimanolis said, adding that such meetings are “of great value” in strengthening bilateral cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other regional players.
According to the Minister, those high-level contacts provided a platform to support Cyprus’ candidacy for re-election to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Council, a goal the country has since secured. “Cyprus’ re-election to the IMO Council is particularly important, especially under the current geopolitical conditions and the challenges facing global shipping,” Ms. Hadjimanolis said, noting that Cyprus placed seventh in the 2025 elections, compared with 12th place in 2023.
Addressing competitiveness more broadly, she stated that “despite the challenges posed by rising operational costs, evolving regulatory frameworks and geopolitical uncertainties, Cyprus remains committed to maintaining and enhancing its competitiveness in the global maritime sector”.
“Our strategy focuses on proactive regulatory adaptation, investment in digitalisation and sustainable shipping practices, and targeted incentives to attract and retain international shipping companies,” she added, pointing also to continued investment in maritime education and training.
Industry engagement remains equally important., with Ms. Hadjimanolis describing Maritime Cyprus 2025 as a key platform for dialogue and visibility. “Maritime Cyprus represents an important platform for showcasing Cyprus’ maritime know-how and cluster, as well as engaging with key stakeholders from the global shipping community,” she said.
Looking ahead to Cyprus’ Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2026, Ms. Hadjimanolis said shipping will be firmly placed on the European agenda.
“Our key priority will be to strengthen the role of seafarers, who remain the backbone of international trade and maritime transport,” she stated, adding that emphasis will be placed on education, skills and women’s participation. To that end, Cyprus is preparing a declaration to be discussed and adopted during the Informal Meeting of EU Ministers responsible for maritime affairs in Nicosia in April 2026.
“This declaration will serve as a joint European commitment to empower the next generation of seafarers to lead a modern, resilient and inclusive maritime sector,” she said.
Related Article:
Χατζημανώλη: Η ναυτιλία δυνατό χαρτί για την κυπριακή οικονομία
Cyprus shipping enters 2026 in stronger shape, says minister | Cyprus Mail
INTERNATIONAL NEWS
5. Climate Change has turned Greenland into a major maritime passage and a target for Trump
On Sunday, 4th January 2026, in an interview to the Atlantic, US President Trump reiterated his intention to acquire Greenland, stating that it is “surrounded” by Chinese and Russian ships, which necessitates increased U.S. defense.
According to political and financial experts, three interconnected factors, accentuated by the climate crisis, make Greenland such an important strategic region – its geopolitical position, its natural resources and the potential northern shipping routes around it. Greenland lies between the US and Europe and astride the so-called GIUK gap – a maritime passage between Greenland, Iceland and the UK that links the Arctic to the Atlantic Ocean. This location makes it essential for controlling access to the North Atlantic, for both trade and security.
As the climate crisis melts Arctic ice, this makes northern shipping routes navigable for more of the year, with implications for both trade and security. The new shipping routes created by the melting ice provide alternatives to the Suez canal through the Arctic that shorten the journey from western Europe to east Asia by almost half. China and Russia agreed in November to collaborate on developing new Arctic shipping routes.
On Sunday, 4th January 2026, President Trump repeated that “Greenland is covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place” . “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security, and Denmark is not going to be able to do it”, he stated.
As a response, leaders from Greenland and Denmark have repeatedly said that Greenland is not for sale. On Monday, 5th January 2026, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen reiterated that she had already “made it very clear where the Kingdom of Denmark stands, and that Greenland has repeatedly said that it does not want to be part of the United States”, warning that it could lead to the demise of the NATO alliance. On Wednesday, 7th January 2026, eight of Europe’s top leaders came to the defense of Greenland in a joint statement, saying that security in the Arctic must “be achieved collectively, in conjunction with NATO allies including the United States, by upholding the principles of the U.N. Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.”
On Thursday, 8th January 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that he intends to speak with Danish officials next week on U.S. involvement in the territory.
Chinese authorities have pushed back. On Monday, 5th January 2026, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian criticized Washington for “using the so-called ‘China threat’ as a pretext for itself to seek selfish gains.”
China described itself as a “near-Arctic state” in its 2018 official Arctic Policy, asserting its right to use resources and develop shipping routes in the Arctic. State-linked Chinese firms have also invested heavily in Arctic energy projects and developed maritime routes that could reduce shipping times between Asia and Europe.
“China would push back hard against any U.S. move to take control of Greenland, given Beijing’s commercial interests on the island — from resource exploration to the security of Arctic shipping routes,” said Xinbo Wu, director at the Center for American Studies at Shanghai-based Fudan University.
Related Articles
Why Is Trump So Intent on Acquiring Greenland? | TIME
Why does Trump want Greenland so much, and why is it so important strategically? | CNN
Why is Donald Trump renewing calls for takeover of Greenland? | Greenland | The Guardian
Trump’s Greenland gambit puts China on edge after Venezuela operation
Trump’s key barrier to best Greenland deal: Trump | Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide
6. US seizes Venezuela-linked, Russian-flagged oil tanker, questions of jurisdiction are raised
On Wednesday, 7th January 2026, the U.S. seized a Russian-flagged oil tanker that was being shadowed by a Russian submarine, after pursuing it for more than two weeks across the Atlantic as part of Washington's efforts to block Venezuelan oil exports.
The U.S. military's European Command announced that the Trump administration had seized the vessel for violating U.S. sanctions. “The blockade of sanctioned and illicit Venezuelan oil remains in full effect — anywhere in the world," U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegset stated.
In a statement, the Russian Transport Ministry said the US seizure was a violation of maritime law.“ In accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, freedom of navigation applies in the high seas, and no state has the right to use force against vessels duly registered in the jurisdictions of other states,” it said in a statement.
Dimitris Ampatzidis, senior risk and compliance analyst at energy consulting firm Kpler, told CNBC “this has moved beyond a sanctions case into a real-time jurisdictional challenge, where the key question is what legal basis exists for enforcement on the high seas”. “The vessel’s identity and history remain constant, but its flag status can significantly raise the diplomatic stakes”, Mr. Ampatzidis stated. According to maritime lawyers, a vessel is essentially considered a floating island of the country whose flag it bears.
Separately, the U.S. Coast Guard also intercepted another Venezuela-linked tanker in Latin American waters on Wednesday., 7th January 2026.
The U.S. military's Southern Command said that the Panama-flagged supertanker, which is under sanctions, was intercepted before dawn and described it as a "stateless, sanctioned dark fleet motor tanker."
Maritime experts have told CNBC these seizures may have been conducted under the 2002 Salas-Becker agreement, which allows U.S. authorities to board Panamanian-flagged vessels with just two hours’ notice.
After not officially condemning the military operations in Venezuela and the way in which the United States arrested President Nicolas Maduro, Brussels has been unable to take a position on the seizure of the Russian ships in international waters.
The international press asked whether the European Commission intended to condemn the incident, but the deputy head of the EU executive’s press office, Arianna Podestà, quickly dismissed the question and the matter, arguing that “it is not for us to judge the actions of other international partners.” These words confirm the difficulties faced by the European Union, which, despite everything, continues to consider Washington an ally.
Related Articles
Exclusive: US seizes Venezuela-linked, Russian-flagged oil tanker after weeks-long pursuit | Reuters
Oil ship seized by U.S. over Venezuela ban newly listed under Russian flag
US seizes Venezuela-linked Russian oil tanker | Oil and Gas News | Al Jazeera
US seizes two 'ghost fleet' tankers linked to Venezuelan oil
The EU also refrains from taking a position on the seizure of Russian shadow ships by the US
7. Trump dumps organizations that shape global maritime policy and shipping regulations, including UNCTAD and ReCAAP
On the 7th January 2025, the Trump administration issued a Memorandum announcing that the United States will withdraw from a number of international organisations, including the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
The decision comes shortly before ReCAAP is due to report that piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore reached their highest level in 2025 in nearly two decades.
In total, the United States plans to withdraw from 66 organisations, including 31 United Nations bodies such as UN Trade & Development and bodies that shape global maritime policy and shipping regulations. For the shipping sector, the U.S. will pull out of the following relevant organizations:
- UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which shape global environmental and shipping emissions standards.
- The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and
- the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), potentially affecting maritime safety, port regulation, and trade policy coordination.
Other exits, such as from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), may also influence the adoption of alternative fuels and sustainability practices.
The withdrawals follow a review ordered by President Donald Trump in February, shortly after his inauguration, to assess organisations considered to be contrary to US interests. The White House said the withdrawals would be carried out in accordance with applicable law, although the timing remains unclear. The list does not include the International Maritime Organization, of which the United States remains a member. The US was re-elected to the IMO Council in December, extending its long-standing participation in the organisation.
Related Article:
Trump dumps anti-piracy body on eve of major report
US withdraws from major organizations including UNCTAD and ReCAAP - SAFETY4SEA
8. BIMCO: Suez Canal transits still 60% down since last Houthi attack and IFSMA: Risk mitigation amid renewed Somali piracy activity
According to the Shipping Number of the Week, issued by BIMCO on the 7th January 2025, although the Houthis announced an end to attacks on commercial shipping, with 29 September marking their last reported incident, traffic through the Suez Canal did not recover as anticipated. In the first week of 2026, canal transits remained approximately 60% below the level recorded during the same week in 2023, prompting widespread diversions around the Cape of Good Hope. Throughout 2025, the reduction in Suez Canal transits remained broadly stable across most shipping sectors, with the exception of the product tanker segment, where higher freight rate premiums encouraged increased use of the canal. Consequently, Suez transits in the fourth quarter of 2025 were only 19% lower than in 2023, compared with a 45% reduction in 2024.
Since the onset of the attacks, nearly all container vessels have avoided the Suez Canal. However, CMA CGM has recently announced that its MEDEX and INDAMEX services will return to Suez Canal routes in January 2026. While the safety of crews, vessels, and cargo remains the primary consideration, declining Red Sea war risk premiums may support a broader return to the canal. In early December, S&P Global reported that premiums had fallen to 0.2% of hull value, the lowest level since November 2023, down from 0.5% prior to the Israel–Hamas ceasefire. These developments suggest that a normalisation of shipping through the Suez Canal is now more likely than at any point in the past two years, although the pace and extent of recovery remain uncertain.
At the same time, maritime security risks in the wider region persist. Piracy off Somalia has re-emerged since October 2025, with coordinated pirate groups operating far offshore in the Somali Basin and adjacent Indian Ocean. These groups have demonstrated the capability to conduct long-range operations up to 800–1,000 nautical miles under favourable conditions. On 6 November 2025, a Malta-flagged tanker was fired upon and boarded approximately 560 nm southeast of Eyl. The crew secured themselves in the citadel, and EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, led by ESPS VICTORIA, intervened, resulting in the vessel being abandoned by pirates. All 24 crew members were confirmed safe.
Operators are advised to:
- Conduct voyage-specific risk assessments reflecting the current threat.
- Confirm ship hardening and watchkeeping measures.
- Register and report daily to UKMTO and MSCIO.
- Follow BMP Maritime Security guidance on incident response and evidence preservation.
AIS use should follow flag-state and company policy. U.S.-flagged vessels are advised to disable AIS in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Somali Basin unless safety requires otherwise. Regardless of AIS settings, vessels must maintain reliable communications and report position and status consistently during high-risk transits.
Related Article:
SAFETY4SEA 7/1 - BIMCO: Suez Canal transits still 60% down since last Houthi attack
SAFETY4SEA 8/1 - IFSMA: Risk mitigation amid renewed Somali piracy activity
Suez Canal transits still 60% down 100 days after the last Houthi attack
9. US TREASURY REPORT
The US Treasury Report for all actions reported is hereby attached.
Related Article:
Attachment 2: US Treasury Report for week 02/01/2026- 0/01/2026
10. PIRACY REPORT
The WTS Report is hereby attached.
Related Article:
Attachment 3: WTS Report: 9 January 2026
Nothing important to report from the ILO and the House of Representatives.