CUS NEWS REPORT FOR WEEK 32 OF 2026

Four New Officials Join Cyprus Government Reshuffle - Who Is Who

Three Cabinet Reshuffles in 3.5 Years and the 18-Month Criterion

As the IMO develops a legally binding framework for biofouling management, expected to be adopted in 2029, industry input is essential to ensure future requirements are practical, effective and workable for global shipping. To support this process, BIMCO has launched two surveys focusing on the availability of in-water inspection and hull cleaning services in ports, giving industry stakeholders the opportunity to help shape future regulations.

The port survey aims to build a global picture of the availability of in-water inspection and cleaning services by gathering information on existing services, operational challenges and good practices from BIMCO's agency network and port representatives. The service provider survey, meanwhile, targets underwater inspection companies, hull cleaning providers and other specialist organisations to assess the capacity, capability and regional availability of the infrastructure needed to support future biofouling management requirements.

Together, the findings will provide valuable evidence to help ensure future IMO measures are practical, proportionate and supported by the necessary infrastructure.

As mentioned above, the third survey, launching in September, will gather feedback from shipowners, operators and managers on their experience implementing the 2023 IMO Biofouling Guidelines. It will explore implementation challenges, costs and operational considerations, while identifying areas where the guidelines could be improved ahead of the introduction of future mandatory requirements.

In conclusion, these surveys are intended to build a clearer understanding of the practical realities of biofouling management from the perspectives of ports, service providers and shipowners. The insights gathered will support BIMCO's engagement at the IMO and help ensure that future measures are informed by operational experience, reflect the realities of international trade, and can be implemented consistently across the global fleet.

To participate in the surveys, please click here.

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BIMCO 05/08 - BIMCO launches surveys to support practical biofouling management

b. Revised PRC Maritime Code: Key considerations for managing contractual risk

On 5 August 2026, BIMCO released an article examining the significance of the revised Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, which came into effect on 1 May 2026, and identifying three key related developments that may affect the allocation of contractual risk in international carriage involving Chinese ports. The article highlights the need for a coordinated contractual approach to help parties preserve commercial certainty.

Three aspects of the revised Code deserve particular attention:

● Mandatory application of the Code to Chinese port trades

The revised Code introduces a mandatory conflict of laws rule. Where a contract of carriage involves a Chinese port of loading or discharge, Chapter IV will apply compulsorily, affecting key areas including carrier obligations, cargo liability, defences, limitation regimes and delivery obligations. The key issue for carriers may be less the substance of the Code itself and more whether existing contractual documentation continues to achieve the intended allocation of risk. Incorporating charter party terms into bills of lading may not be sufficient to avoid the Code’s mandatory application, particularly where incorporation requirements are not met. Carriers should consider:

i. Reviewing governing law assumptions for Chinese trades;

ii. Reassessing incorporation wording and Clause Paramount provisions; and

iii. Checking whether standard bill of lading clauses continue to reflect the intended contractual risk allocation.

● Expanded carrier responsibilities and the broader definition of “carrier”

While the revised Code broadly follows the Hague-Visby Rules, it introduces important changes. The carrier’s period of responsibility is extended from receipt of cargo to delivery, potentially increasing exposure across the logistics chain. The definition of “carrier” is also expanded to include not only the contractual carrier, but also actual carriers and other parties performing carrier functions, such as terminal operators and warehouse providers. These parties may face direct claims while relying on the Code’s statutory defences and limitation regimes. Carriers should consider:

i. Reviewing arrangements with logistics partners and service providers;

ii. Reassessing indemnity and liability provisions; and

iii. Ensuring Himalaya clauses remain effective alongside the Code’s protections.

● Claims handling and the revised approach to limitation periods

The revised Code retains the one-year limitation period for cargo claims but introduces a more flexible approach. A claimant’s demand for performance may interrupt the limitation period and cause it to restart, potentially extending the timeframe for bringing claims. For claims handlers, this increases the importance of careful communication and record keeping, as routine correspondence may have limitation implications. Carriers should consider:

i. Reviewing claims handling procedures;

ii. Ensuring teams understand the impact of communications on limitation; and

iii. Maintaining clear records of cargo claim correspondence and demands.

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BIMCO 05/08 - Revised PRC Maritime Code: Key considerations for managing contractual risk

While lawmakers are debating the wording of the proposed deal, it seems that, under the proposal, Iran would be able to intervene when necessary, in relation to inbound maritime traffic. Outbound vessels would follow a designated route between Iran and Oman, with clearance granted through Oman after notifying Iranian authorities, according to a senior Iranian source cited by Reuters.

The arrangement could also introduce mandatory transit or service fees for ships using the strait. A letter submitted to the UN shipping agency described such charges as “a toll in all but name.” Iran is reportedly seeking fees equivalent to 5%–7% of cargo values, while Oman has discussed a lower rate of around 3%. The United States, however, has rejected the introduction of any transit fees. The U.S. has sanctioned the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, which Iran established in May to oversee operations in the waterway, and has restricted U.S. persons from receiving Iranian government services related to guarantees of safe passage. As a result, companies making payments under the proposed system could face sanctions exposure, including potential asset freezes.

On Thursday, 7th August 2026, Trump said the talks are “moving along” with respect to the proposed deal.

Furthermore, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said earlier this week that an understanding with Oman had been reached “in principle,” and state TV cited one lawmaker on Friday, 8th August 2026, as saying the final text and details of an agreement with Muscat will be announced “soon.”

However, the Fars news agency reported that some Iranian politicians are pushing for clauses such as a ban on U.S. and Israeli ships from the waterway, a condition that would defy Washington’s demand for free passage despite a lack of U.S.- or Israeli-flagged commercial ships globally. Other modifications reported by Fars include an Iranian demand for compensation from “hostile countries,” a proposed ban on cargo related to Israel, and a fee structure covering services like insurance and environmental costs.

It’s also unclear whether Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has given his assent to the proposal, a condition for it to go ahead.

The Wall Street Journal reported Arab mediators discussing a deal with Iran for the Strait of Hormuz are concerned that the nation’s diplomats may not be able to guarantee compliance with any agreement reached. Mediators say Tehran’s lead negotiators are under growing pressure from hardline officials to eke out more explicit references to Iran’s role in the strait and clearer benefits.

Houthi Attack Raises Fears of attacks on ports

Meanwhile, regional tensions continue to escalate, with Riyadh warning of possible coordinated attacks by Yemen’s Houthis and Iran-backed Iraqi militias. A senior Saudi official said intelligence from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other regional partners indicated that Houthi forces and Iraqi militias linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be preparing further attacks against Saudi civilian infrastructure, including energy facilities and ports.

Multinational coalition’s naval defence to protect trade, energy routes.

Amid violence in the region from Houthi attacks and the US-Iran war, on Friday, 8th August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defence agreement, which includes a mutual defence clause, under which an armed attack on one member would be considered an attack on all three. Officials stressed that the agreement is defensive in nature, not directed at any specific country, and would complement rather than replace existing security arrangements.

Furthermore, on Thursday, 7th August 2026, Saudi Arabia announced the appointment of a commander for a multinational maritime defence alliance to protect freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The commander will oversee joint naval defence, coordinate with member states and other maritime coalitions, and carry out missions under the coalition’s charter.

Bahrain, Bangladesh, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey and Yemen announced the formation of the coalition on July 30.

More countries are completing the procedures to join the coalition with some having already signed the joint declaration and others preparing to sign the declaration and charter before their formal accession as founding members, the Saudi statement said.

Related Articles:

Attachment 1: Reuters 06/08 - Proposed Hormuz passage deal not feasible for shipping industry, sources say

Attachment 2: Reuters 07/08 - Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia wounds 11 civilians as kingdom warns of wider threat

Attachment 3: Reuters 07/08 - Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to sign joint defence deal amid regional turmoil

SAFETY4SEA 06/08 - Iran says Hormuz shipping talks with Oman reach final stage

SAFETY4SEA 05/08 - Oman-Iran talks make progress on Strait of Hormuz reopening agreement

Iran Debates Hormuz Wording as Trump Says Deal’s ‘Moving Along’

Trump reveals direct involvement in Iran negotiations to reopen Strait of Hormuz | Fox News Video

Iran moves to ban U.S., Israeli ships from Hormuz, charge toll : NPR

Deal with Iran over Strait of Hormuz may require compromise

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan sign defence pact amid regional war

The industry groups stressed that seafarers are already operating in a high-risk environment following recent regional conflict and that ensuring their safety should remain a priority. They argued that introducing mandatory charges would not only increase costs for shipping but also disrupt global supply chains, raise energy prices, contribute to inflation, and increase economic uncertainty. The associations further warned that allowing transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz would weaken the international legal framework governing navigation through international straits, particularly the transit passage rights protected under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They called on the UN and IMO to ensure that these established legal principles are not compromised as part of wider regional security or political negotiations.

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SAFETY4SEA 05/08 - Global shipping groups urge UN and IMO to reject Strait of Hormuz tolls

ICS 05/8 - Joint open letter in relation to no compulsory tolls or charges being introduced in the Strait of Hormuz

Saudi Arabia and the UAE raised concerns that the framework’s proposed compliance mechanism could place a disproportionate burden on long-distance shipping routes and remote, trade-dependent economies. While the NZF applies a uniform carbon pricing approach, the two countries argue that its economic impact would vary significantly depending on market conditions, cargo types, and the ability of companies to pass additional costs through supply chains. In their submission, they warned that the costs of compliance would not be distributed equally across the global shipping sector, with certain trade routes and economies potentially facing greater financial pressure than others.

The two countries identified several key concerns:

● Unequal cost distribution: Compliance costs would affect shipping markets differently. In markets with excess vessel capacity, costs could be passed more directly onto cargo owners, while tighter markets could respond through operational adjustments, such as slower sailing speeds, potentially reducing capacity and increasing freight rates.

● Disadvantage for long-haul routes: Saudi Arabia and the UAE argue that the framework effectively creates a distance-based trade cost, as longer voyages require more fuel consumption and therefore generate higher compliance costs.

● Impact on remote economies: Countries that depend heavily on maritime trade but are geographically distant from major markets could face higher costs for imports and exports, potentially affecting competitiveness and economic development.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have urged the IMO not to proceed with the Net-Zero Framework in its current form, arguing that the economic impacts require further assessment before implementation, instead, they called for alternative approaches that would ensure the framework remains globally applicable while avoiding structural disadvantages for specific countries, trade routes, or commodity sectors.

In their submission, the two countries asked the IMO working group to:

● Recognise that carbon compliance costs will have different economic effects depending on who ultimately absorbs the costs through freight rates, delivered prices, and profit margins.

● Acknowledge that the framework could create geographic inequalities because compliance costs increase with voyage distance and fuel consumption.

● Consider alternative measures that better distribute the economic impacts of decarbonisation across global shipping markets.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s position is that maritime decarbonisation should continue, but the transition must avoid creating disproportionate economic burdens on certain regions and trade-dependent economies.

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SAFETY4SEA 04/08 - Saudi Arabia and UAE challenge IMO Net-Zero Framework over trade impact

Attachment 4: IMO 20/07 – Consideration of Proposals, submitted by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU lists five additional individuals supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex - Consilium

EU sanctions five people linked to Russia’s military industry after Ukraine strikes | Euronews

EU adds 5 people to Russia sanctions list after latest deadly attacks on Ukraine – POLITICO

Measures on tankers are intended to disrupt the logistical networks that move sanctioned goods and help evade restrictions. By targeting companies that import tantalum and niobium, the UK is focusing on supply chains for materials that can be used in military equipment.

For businesses and compliance teams, the listing of companies that import tantalum and niobium will be significant. Firms involved in the trade of these materials may need to review their due diligence, contracts and supply chains to ensure they are not dealing with designated parties. That scrutiny may, in turn, reduce channels through which the materials can be moved to military end uses, although outcomes will depend on international co-ordination and market responses.

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UK continues crackdown on Russia with tough new sanctions - GOV.UK

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UK targets Russian banks, tankers and rare metals in new sanctions | London Daily News

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